

STATEMENT OF  
VICE ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN  
UNITED STATES NAVY

BEFORE THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES SENATE

CONCERNING HIS  
NOMINATION AS  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

3 February 1981

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

It is a distinct pleasure to appear before this Committee on this occasion. I have been nominated by the President to serve as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. You are all generally aware of my background and my most recent assignment as Director, National Security Agency. However, it may be useful for me to review that background and experience in light of this nomination.

As a native of the state of Texas, I received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of Texas at Austin in 1950. Shortly after joining the Naval Reserve in 1951 and being commissioned as an Ensign in 1952, I joined the USS VALLEY FORGE, then participating in operations in the Korean area. Later, I served in various administrative assignments in the European theater. Following release from and then return to active duty with the Navy, I served in various shipborne operational assignments and in several intelligence assignments functioning as an intelligence analyst and as the Assistant Naval Attache, American Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden.

Subsequent assignments included service as the Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commander SEVENTH Fleet; attendance at the National War College; Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Director of Naval Intelligence; and Vice Director for Plans, Operations and Support, Defense Intelligence Agency. Since 5 July 1977, I have had the pleasure of serving as Director, National Security Agency.

Although my current assignment has involved me heavily in the collection and production of intelligence information, the majority of my experience during 21 years of service in the field of intelligence has been as an analyst and as a manager. The variety of my assignments has provided me with a unique perspective on the need to balance the production and analytic facets of the intelligence mission and to provide for the needs of the Nation's policymakers both in the Executive and the Congress.

I am in complete agreement with Mr. Casey in his statement to this Committee that it is vital that this Nation have a strong and effective intelligence organization with a wide range of capabilities and the flexibility to adapt and focus them on whatever exterior threats or problems confront the nation. While I face the coming years with optimism, it is tinged with a realization--based on my years of experience in various parts of this business--of the immense task we face. I have frequently recalled a statement made by a senior intelligence officer in 1977 with respect to the current and future intelligence environment, when he pointed out:

"There are more things about which we need intelligence data, but there is the prospect that intelligence may be harder to obtain."

Recent events have re-emphasized the increasing conflict of these real world facts. Today a greater portion of the world's nations withhold information concerning their activities, plans and intentions. There is less free and open access of the character that we value as a people and a Nation. At the same time there is

greater competition for and control of available resources. As a result there is a significantly greater need for a variety of intelligence information that extends beyond the historical orientation on military and political information. Equally significant is the growing mobility of our principal adversaries with the accompanying threat of the use of power in the third world to challenge our long term economic, political, and military interests. The growth in the use of various forms of terror adds a destabilizing factor that requires modifications to the traditional means of prioritizing intelligence coverage and allocating intelligence resources. The increasing sophistication of technology and of its use by our adversaries further complicates our ability to collect raw data and refocus analytic effort. At the same time, there are recurrent efforts around the world to spread disinformation about our intelligence activities and discredit our intelligence agencies designed to reduce the willingness of individuals and entities to work with us.

In order to meet these challenges, we must foster within our Government an environment that affords the Intelligence Community the resources necessary to provide a sufficient variety of modern collection methods including technical and human capabilities, to continuously maintain a technical base of information, to focus upon any particular crisis of the moment while maintaining our worldwide watch, and to meet the users' needs for information concerning a wide variety of interests. This requires that we focus our attention in the budget process on the resources needed to maintain the whole

system rather than on what can be cut based on the lack of current interest in a particular area. It means that we must recruit and retain personnel of great skill to design, build, operate, process, analyze and report finished intelligence, and to assist the users of intelligence information in understanding what can be and has been provided.

In order to assure that finished intelligence information is the best available, it is my view that there is a real benefit from encouraging strong multi-discipline centers of expertise within the intelligence community. No one agency has a monopoly on talent or sources and competition spurs each to maintain higher standards of performance and service. Guidance in the form of standards and in the allocation of community services is needed and is a useful function, and all duplication of functional activities should be examined regularly to ensure that it is productive redundancy. What is needed is a healthy competitive Community that enjoys the confidence of the Government's policymakers and of the Nation.

We now have a wealth of experience concerning the guidelines under which intelligence agencies operate. A fine tuning of those guidelines, especially the detailed procedures that implement those guidelines, may be in order. However, on the whole the guidelines and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act have evolved into a system that provides procedural protections for the rights of individuals and flexible guidelines for intelligence agencies. Although there is some work to be done in the area of emergency authorization to provide flexible responses to crisis

situations, and perhaps some need for intelligence aspects, I believe that the overall system is working and is not in need of a major overhaul.

My predecessor as the DDCI served both as the day-to-day manager of the CIA and as an active participant in Community affairs. It is my expectation that I will serve in a similar capacity and I have discussed the matter with Director Casey, who agrees. It is his expressed desire that I pay particular attention to the DCI's community responsibilities and I will spend a good deal of my time on that.

Congress and the Executive Branch have worked closely in the past few years to establish a solid foundation for cooperation. This past year that foundation was incorporated into the National Security Act of 1947 as a new section 501 covering congressional oversight. This new section maintains the balance between the two branches while providing a mechanism for permitting Presidential flexibility where sensitive operations are involved. Director Casey has already stated his position on this matter to you. This Committee and I have been cooperating on these matters under Executive Order 1 and now under Section 501 for the past three and one-half years and can assure the Committee that I am in agreement with Director Casey's statement to you "to cooperate fully in facilitating the oversight through which Congress can ensure that the intelligence community operates within the limits of the law."

If confirmed, I look forward to working productively with Director Casey and this Committee on the problems facing the Intelligence Community and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Bobby Ray Inman

April 4, 1931	Born in Rhonesboro, Texas.
1950	B.A. University of Texas at Austin.
1952	Commissioned Ensign, U.S. Navy. Joined the USS VALLEY FORGE. Served in Korean theater.
1953-1955	Served in European theater. Became aide to the Deputy Commander in Chief of Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
1955-1972	Held operational assignments on USS MULLINIX and USS ROANOKE. Subsequently served as Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Briefer; Operations Intelligence Analyst at Ft. Meade, Maryland; and Assistant Naval Attache, American Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden.
1972	Graduated from National War College.
1972-1973	Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.
1973-1974	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
1974-1976	Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
1976	Promoted to Vice Admiral.
1976-1977	Vice Director for Plans, Operations and Support, Defense Intelligence Agency.
1977-Jan. 1981	Director of the National Security Agency.
DECORATIONS:	Navy Distinguished Service Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of

Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal;  
the Joint Service Commendation Medal;  
the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon and  
the Meritorious Unit Commendation  
Ribbon; the Navy Occupation Service  
Medal, Europe Clasp; National Defense  
Service Medal with bronze star, Korean  
Service Medal with four stars; Vietnam  
Service Medal with one silver star and  
one bronze star and the United Nations  
Service Medal; the Korean Presidential  
Unit Citation Badge; the Republic of  
Vietnam Gallantry Medal, First Class;  
the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces  
Meritorious Unit Citation and the Republic  
of Vietnam Presidential Unit Citation.